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Abstract In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the 
 problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood 
 as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the 
Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between 
proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the 
problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, 
there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions 
to the problem of deep disagreement.
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Qué respuestas optimistas al desacuerdo 
profundo generan buenos (y malos) efectos
Resumen El presente artículo presenta tres tesis. En primer 
 lugar, plantea que el problema del desacuerdo pro-
 fundo se entiende, convenientemente, como un 
ejemplo del problema del criterio desde la óptica del escepticis-
mo. En segundo lugar, existen similitudes estructurales entre 
las respuestas optimistas que se proponen con respecto al des-
acuerdo profundo y al problema del criterio. Y, en tercer lugar, 
ante dichas similitudes, las soluciones que se proponen frente al 
problema del desacuerdo profundo generan tanto buenas como 
malas consecuencias.
Palabras clave: 
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The fact of disagreement is inescapable in social life. Who would 
deny it (and thereby disagree)? Some disagreements are tractable 
and even resolvable, but others are long-standing, wide-ranging, and 
seem irresolvable. The challenge of these disagreements of significant 
depth is that of identifying what rational procedure generally, and 
what tool of argument specifically, can break the logjam. Despite 
the fact that the special technical notion of deep disagreements has 
been around only since Robert Fogelin’s 1985 essay, the form of the 
problem has been at work in the longstanding skeptical Problem of 
the Criterion since its statement in the late ancient period in Sextus 
Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I think it is instructive to view 
the problem of deep disagreement as an instance of the problem of 
the criterion, and so I will lay out the structural similarities between 
the two problems and turn then to show why this analogy is useful. 
In particular, the isomorphism between the two problems pays off 
when evaluating proposed solutions to the problems.
The problem of the criterion admits of two broad classes 
of solution, aptly identified by Roderick Chisholm (1973) as 
Particularism and Methodism. Both forms of solution have their own 
appeal, but both suffer from the same structural epistemic problem: 
they beg the question, and so do not fully answer the challenge of 
the problem of the criterion. The same, as I see it, goes for optimistic 
replies to the problem of deep disagreement. (For the distinction 
between optimistic and pessimistic solutions, see Aikin, 2019; and 
Godden & Brenner, 2010). The optimistic solutions I will survey are 
Peter Davson-Galle’s “primitive epistemic assent” (1992, p. 150) and 
Vesel Memedi’s “third party” mediators (2007, p. 5). In both cases, 
there are appealing features to the optimistic replies, but here are 
significant drawbacks to them as replies, too. Particularly, that they, 
like their cousins purportedly solving the problem of the criterion, beg 
the question, given the description of what deep disagreements are.
The Problem of the Criterion
The problem of the criterion is an ancient skeptical trope that 
can be posed with the following challenge: how can we sort true from 
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false propositions, without presuming we have already sorted them 
appropriately? Here’s how the challenge works, as the presumption 
is revealed with the following circle of reasons, or more evocatively 
termed by the Pyrrhonists, the wheel (diallelus):
Q1: How do I know if these propositions (or presentations) are 
true (or false)?
A1: Because they are assigned a value by a reliable or good 
criterion.
Q2: How do I identify a good or reliable criterion?
A2: A good or reliable criterion correctly sorts true from false 
propositions.
The problem is that in order to give A2, we must have answered 
Q1, which begins the series of questions and answers all over again. 
Hence, we see the wheel of critical reflection that constitutes the 
problem of the criterion. As Sextus Empiricus states the matter:
[I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we 
must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the 
dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about 
the criterion must first be decided (PH, ii.20).
Roderick Chisholm, in his 1973 Aquinas Lecture, The Problem of 
the Criterion, comments on the history and structure of the problem:
And now, you see, we are on the wheel. First we want to find out which are 
the good beliefs and which are the bad ones. To find this out, we have to 
have some way –some method– of deciding which ones are the good ones 
and which are the bad ones. But there are good and bad methods […] And 
so we now have a new problem: How are we to decide which are the good 
methods and which are the bad ones? (1973, p. 10).
The basic structure of the problem is that one must procedurally 
have two things before each other –one must possess the truths to 
identify criteria and criteria to possess truths. And without one or 
the other, one has neither. (See Amico 1993, p. 93; Cling 2014, p. 
165; and Aikin, 2018a on the structure of the problem of the criterion 
being one of a conflict between what must be epistemically prior).
Solutions to the problem of the criterion generally come in two 
forms –either one starts with a set of truths and generates the criteria 
for truth from what these truths share in common, or one begins 
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with criteria and generates truths from their application. That is, 
given the two critical questions and two answers (Q1 and A1, or 
Q2 and A2), one could start with either complex. Chisholm (1973) 
identifies the set of questions as two pairs of questions:
(A) “What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?”
(B) “How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria for 
knowledge? (p. 12).
The solutions, or better, approaches, to the Problem of the 
Criterion are to answer one of the question-complexes first, and 
then turn to answering the other in light of how one had answered 
the first. Chisholm dubs the two strategies ‘Methodists’, who begin 
with questions of criteria, and ‘Particularlists’, who being with the 
question of instances.
I suggest, for the moment, we use the expressions “Methodists” and 
“Particularists”. By “Methodists”, I mean […] those who think they have 
an answer to B, and who then, in terms of it, work out their answer to A. 
And by “Particularists” I mean those who have it the other way around 
(1973, p. 15).
Methodism comes in many forms in epistemology. Empiricism, 
for example, is a form of Methodism –experience provides us with 
truths, it is our criterion. Rationalism, too, is a form of Methodism, 
as the dictates of reason serve as the condition for accepting a 
content as true. Particularism, beginning with a set of truisms, is 
strongly associated with Common Sense traditions. One has a raft 
of commitments that have primarily the common thread that, to 
begin, is the simple fact that they are dictates of common sense –
they are the kinds of things that strike us as silly or even absurd to 
doubt. One then designs the rules for reasoning and our criteria for 
knowledge around these obvious cases.
The trouble, of course, is that these strategies break the rule set 
forth with the initial statement of the challenge of identifying a 
criterion and its associated truths –we must do so without presuming 
that we already have an answer. We must do so without begging the 
question. If truths and criteria for truths are mutually epistemically 
prior to each other, then beginning with either will be epistemically 
out of order. Chisholm, in stating the options as he has (and even in 
stating his case for Particularism) concedes that:
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What few philosophers have had is the courage to recognize is this: We can 
deal with the problem only by begging the question. It seems to me that, if we 
do recognize this fact, as we should, then it is unseemly for us to pretend 
that it isn’t so (1973, p. 37, emphasis added).
The lesson, as I take it, is that solutions to the problem of the 
criterion are less means of showing that the problem is not a problem 
but more ways of managing the problem. In the case of Methodism 
and Particularism, the answers to the challenge beg the question, 
and so are not solutions, given the structure of the problem, but they 
are ways forward for other programs of cognitive management, such 
as making one’s beliefs more systematic and consistent. But, again, 
because of the problem of begging the question, they do not solve the 
problem of the criterion.
Deep Disagreements
A useful strategy for articulating what deep disagreements are 
is to start with a contrast. Normal disagreements are those wherein 
the two disagreeing parties nevertheless agree on some background 
matters –in particular, they agree on some broad set of propositions 
bearing on the item of disagreement and they share a number of 
salient epistemic resources. So, though two people may disagree, 
following Fogelin’s famous examples, about the best path for their 
errands, if they agree about the geography and traffic patterns of 
the city, their disagreement is normal and so tractable. And if 
two people disagree about who was the batting champion in the 
baseball league for a particular year, if they agree that looking up 
the answer in the league’s book of records will settle the matter, 
then they have a normal and tractable disagreement. In short, 
normal disagreements are those wherein the disagreeing parties 
share enough in common that an argument can, in principle, resolve 
the issue. For sure, it’s still possible for a party to remain a holdout 
against the prevailing reasons, but this is a different kind of problem 
from deep disagreements.
When disagreements are deep, the parties do not share the 
relevant background commitments that allow simple reasoning 
to resolution. Nor do they share deference to the same epistemic 
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resources. In cases of deep disagreement, the parties share no 
overlapping commitments or resources. Fogelin holds that, 
consequently, argument is not possible in these instances. He 
reasons that “the possibility of a genuine argumentative exchange 
depends … on the fact that we together share many things” (1985, p. 
6). In turn, since those things are not shared in deep disagreements, 
the disagreements “cannot be resolved through the use of argument, 
for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing” (1985, p. 8).
The analogy between the problem of the criterion and that 
of deep disagreement should be clear. The background procedural 
rule for deep disagreement is what I have elsewhere termed the 
requirement of dialecticality, namely that a premise or resource 
must be acceptable to one’s interlocutor for it to play a legitimately 
resolving role in an argument (Aikin, 2018b, p. 175, and 2018a). It is 
analogous to the rule of support for epistemically prior commitments 
for the problem of the criterion –if one’s justifying reasons depend 
on an unjustified commitment or step, then everything downstream 
from that unjustified component is undercut.
Given the structural similarity between the problem of the 
criterion and deep disagreements, the classes of proposed solutions 
to deep disagreements will have similar problems of question-begging 
that those to the problem of the criterion had. Methodist solutions 
to the problem of the criterion start with sources of or procedures 
for producing commitments. But, as we’d seen with how deep 
disagreements are described, there are no shared salient cognitive 
resources. So Methodist programs with deep disagreements cannot, 
given the structure of the problem, be solutions. And the same goes 
for Particularist solutions –finding sets of truisms from which to 
begin is a hopeless task for deep disagreements, since, by hypothesis, 
there are none in contexts of deep disagreement.
Davson-Galle and Primitive Epistemic Assent
Peter Davson-Galle’s 1992 essay, “Arguing, Arguments, and 
Deep Disagreements” has two theses. The first is that Fogelin’s 
irresolvability thesis is defensible against Andrew Lugg’s 1986 
criticism that a practical perspective on argument resolves deep 
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disagreements. Lugg’s argument was that, in essence, the overlap 
of commitments required for resolving disagreements is itself a 
product of argument, instead of a precondition for it. The details of 
Davson-Galle’s defense need not detain us here, since the target 
for evaluation is his second thesis, that “rational persuasion might 
be more powerful in other ways that Fogelin allows” (1992, p. 154). 
So, though Fogelin’s argumentative pessimism is defensible against 
one critical challenge from Lugg, it is open to a different form of 
optimistic challenge.
Davson-Galle pursues two lines of argument to substantiate the 
second thesis. The first is a negative line –that one can “rationally 
persuade someone of the error of his/her ways by tracing distasteful 
consequences […] One is, so to speak, pointing out an inconsistency in 
the set of propositions s/he subscribes to” (1992, p. 154). This negative 
line establishes that something’s gone wrong, but not what the fix is.
The second line of argument Davson-Galle pursues is to note 
that there are instances of “primitive epistemic assent” around which 
arguments occur and from which they may begin. And further, they 
may be events that bring arguments to abrupt ends. Davson-Galle 
explains what these acts entail with a disagreement between a 
hypothetical Jack and Jill:
What can Jack to? He might be able to create conditions for an act of 
primitive epistemic assent somehow; that is, create circumstances in which 
a proposition is warranted to/by Jill, but not in virtue of any argument or 
the provision of reasons (1992, p. 150).
The thought is that there are other ways we change our minds 
about things other than being on the receiving end of arguments 
from others. We may reflect, or feel, or have experiences. Any 
of these non-argumentative cognitive moments can produce a 
change in view and thereby a resolution. Davson-Galle provides an 
explanation for how this happens:
It might be construed as akin to conversion […] or it might be construed 
as akin to persuading someone to accept it’s raining by opening a blind so 
that he can see that it is so. Either way […] what one is doing is putting the 
other cognitive agent into a situation where a primitive epistemic assent 
occurs: assent is given without reasons for the assent (1992, p. 150).
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The key, Davson-Galle holds, is that Fogelin’s model for deep 
disagreements depends too much on antecedent acceptances for 
rational resolutions –one can use primitive epistemic resources to 
resolve disputes that need no background acceptances. (Along these 
lines, Wang 2018 argues that non-argumentative strategies are the 
only way forward at this stage).
It is clear that Davson-Galle’s solution to the problem of deep 
disagreement is a form of Methodism –that two methods may be 
used for resolution– finding internal contradictions and inducing 
primitive epistemic assents. Davson-Galle concedes that the former 
has significant limitations in that it, again, does not propose a truth 
on the other side of the inconsistency, and it also depends on one’s 
interlocutor sharing some “canons of logic” (1992, p. 154). The latter, 
however, Davson-Galle seems to hold has limits only as far as what 
can be primitively epistemically presented.
First, it is worth noting that what Davson-Galle’s proposal has 
done is significantly shrink the domain of what can count as deep 
disagreements. If, by hypothesis, the disputants do not share either 
salient commitments or cognitive resources in deep disagreements, 
then finding instances of resolutions consequent of discovered 
internal contradictions or primitive epistemic assents is also finding 
instances that are not deep disagreements. That does not mean 
that they are not resolutions, but it does mean that they are not 
resolutions to deep disagreements.
The crucial insight is that if the disagreements are deep in the 
way that Fogelin’s program has stipulated, then it is not just a non-
overlap of commitments but epistemic resources, too, for resolution. 
So internal reductio depends on shared resources for deriving the 
contradiction, and so also does primitive epistemic assent. Given 
the demands of deep disagreements, these resolutions, if successful 
in these fashions, demonstrate the disagreement is not deep. And 
if the disagreement is truly deep, these strategies will, given the 
dialiecticality requirement, beg the question.
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Memedi and Third-Party Mediation
Vesel Memedi argues in “Resolving Deep Disagreement” that 
at least some deep disagreements “can be rationally resolved by 
introducing the concept of ‘third party’ to those particular discourses” 
(2007, p. 1). Memedi’s primary example is that of the conflict between 
Macedonian governmental forces and Albanian armed groups living 
in Macedonia in 2001. The narratives of the conflict’s history and 
what the respective sides are trying to accomplish varied greatly 
between the two parties. The Macedonians accused the Albanians 
of trying to create, as Memedi reports, “a ‘Greater Albanian’ 
state,” but the Albanians reported their motives only as to attain 
“greater rights for Albanians in Macedonia” (2007, p. 6). When the 
debate proceeded along these lines, Memedi holds, there was an 
incommensurability of reasons, and so an argumentative impasse.
The crucial element to Memdi’s case study was a third party to 
the critical discussion. Memedi observes that the audience the two 
primary disagreeing sides appealed to was one outside the debate:
[T]here is a presence of another audience that I think plays a crucial role in 
reconstructing better the discussion between Madedonian and Albanian 
language media. This role is played by ‘the international community’ 
(2007, p. 7).
The upshot is that the way to break the logjam of the deep 
disagreement, Memedi reasons, is to find a judge incorporated into 
the discourse. Memedi’s two criteria for these third party judges are 
that (1) they must be “capable of being influenced,” and (2) they 
must “have the capability to act as ‘mediators of change’”, and in 
particular, this agency means that they are “more powerful” than 
the sides being mediated (2007, p. 9).
One question, of course, is how the fact that the mediator is 
more powerful than the singular parties is relevant to the rational 
resolution to the debate. That one party can convince a stronger 
party to take their side does not count as any more rational a 
resolution than that he party has stronger allies or that one party is 
itself simply stronger than the opposition. I presume that the issue 
of identifying stronger parties as mediators is an acknowledgement 
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of the realism of disagreements –that rational resolution is by itself 
not sufficient for lasting resolutions, but some plausible threat of 
sanctions is required too. Regardless, the important element to 
Memedi’s third party mediator is implicit, at least in the case study 
of the Albanian-Macedonian conflict, namely that both parties to 
the dispute argumentatively appeal to the same third party. That 
is, despite the apparent depth of the disagreement between the two 
parties, they agree on a mediating source of resolution.
It is not difficult to see Memedi’s program as a form of deep 
disagreement Methodism –as Davson-Galle’s program had been 
earlier– one that proposes a procedure for producing resolving reasons 
for the dispute. The problem, as seen before, is that if the sides do 
agree on the mediating party, then they share a cognitive resource, 
and so do not have a deep disagreement, properly described. If they 
are deeply disagreeing, then they will not have a mutually agreed 
upon mediator.
Seeing deep disagreement as an instance of the problem of the 
criterion is useful in this regard, since the mediator strategy is one 
of the methods the ancients had considered when addressing the 
problem of the criterion. Sextus Empiricus went out of his way to 
argue that it begs the question given the structure of the problem. 
“[S]ince there exists great difference among men, let the dogmatists 
first agree together that this is the particular man to whom we must 
attend, and then and only then, let them bid us also to yield him 
our assent […] For if they declare that we must believe the sage, we 
shall ask them, ‘what sage?’ […] [T]hey will be unable to return us a 
unanimous answer” (PH, ii.38). And so, insofar as there is first-order 
deep disagreement about the facts of the case, there will be second-
order disagreement about who is the right resource for accurate 
judgment. Again there may be agreement about who is the strongest 
and who can most effectively enforce a decision, but this is not the 
challenge of the criterion or of deep disagreement.
Memedi qualifies his solution to the problem of deep 
disagreement by noting that the third-party mediation strategy is 
highly contingent, so his conclusion is “modest” (2007, p. 10). His 
qualification is that his solution is indexed only to cases where there 
is a deep disagreement and the two parties address a moveable and 
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stronger third party. Only under those conditions is there hope for 
this kind of rational resolution to deep disagreements. The results 
of the case study are not universal for deep disagreement, but are 
restricted to these conditions. “There is no intention on my part to 
generalize these two criteria to other types of discourse,” Memedi 
clarifies (2007, p. 9).
The Good News and the Bad News
Let me start with the good news. What optimistic programs with 
deep disagreement, those on analogy with the problem of the criterion 
with formally Methodist approaches in particular, get right is that 
there are many ways that what look initially like deep disagreements 
are, in fact, not absolutely deep disagreements. To appreciate this 
point, a distinction is in order. Depth is a gradable concept, so 
disagreements may be of various depths, some more deep than others 
(see Aikin, 2019; Duran, 2016; and Wang, 2018). Disagreements are 
deeper in terms of how many dialectical steps must be traversed to 
address the issue, and those that are absolutely deep have no upper 
limit on the steps necessary. So with some disagreements, only one 
argument is necessary, and with others, many back-and-forths are 
required. The former are not deep at all, and the latter are of degreed 
depth. But, again, given Fogelin’s description of deep disagreement, 
there are others without any number of steps to get to resolution 
–any given argument will occasion more challenges. And so, with 
these, we are thrown upon the skeptic’s wheel.
What deep disagreement optimism gets right, then, is that there 
are instances wherein we have disagreements of depth, but we may 
yet find new, unanticipated, epistemic and argumentative resources 
that contribute to the resolution of the dispute. In Davson-Galle’s 
case, ‘primitive epistemic assent’ is a shared cognitive resource 
that can break the logjam of conflicting reasons. But, if we can do 
this and appeal to these sources of belief, it shows that though the 
disagreement may have depth, it is not absolutely deep. The same 
goes for Memedi’s program of third-party mediation. The disagreement 
on the first level may be deep in that when the parties address each 
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other, they cannot provide any reasons that meet the requirements of 
dialecticality. But if they happen to share regard for a third party to 
judge the dispute, they in turn have a shared cognitive resource. And 
so, though the dispute has a degree of depth, it is not absolutely deep.
Consequently, the good news is that optimistic programs with 
deep disagreement give us hope and methods for proceeding in 
the face of what often seems to be deep disagreement. The hope 
is that not all disagreements that are deep are absolutely deep, and 
the methods provided are those of revealing ways forward in cases 
wherein we think we face a deep disagreement.
The bad news is that these are not solutions to the problem 
of deep disagreement, so described. If the disagreements are deep, 
or as I’ve termed them for clarity’s sake with the gradable concept 
of depth, absolutely deep, then these solutions will share the same 
problem that all Methodist solutions to the problem of the criterion 
have had –they will beg the question, and so are not really solutions.
What deep disagreement optimism of this particular Methodist 
form amounts to, then, is a program of showing that the domain 
of deep disagreement recedes when we apply our critical skills to 
the disagreements before us. Argument’s reach is broader than the 
pessimistic view that many who read Fogelin take –disagreements 
may be of depth, but there are many ways that we may nevertheless 
get to the bottom of things in them. What deep disagreement 
optimisms, at least of the form evaluated here, get wrong, however, is 
that these are not solutions to the problem of deep disagreement. This 
is because conditions for optimism identified in them are conditions 
that simply don’t obtain in instances of deep disagreement, properly 
described. The problem, as I take it, has a particular dialogical 
structure, and given that structure, the approaches proposed cannot 
be rationally satisfactory solutions. If the conditions do obtain, 
then the optimistic views are about disagreements that are not 
absolutely deep. Thereby, they are not solutions to the problem of 
deep disagreement, but more incremental restrictions of the domain 
for the problem.
In a way, this conclusion should be a happy one for both deep 
disagreement optimists and for deep disagreement pessimists. 
The pessimists are right that the problem, properly described, is 
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rationally insoluble in ways analogous to the longstanding skeptical 
challenge of the problem of the criterion. But the result is also happy 
for the optimists, because we see the extension of the domain for 
deep disagreements shrink. What loomed as a worrisome global 
problem for argumentation is by piecemeal theoretical work, being 
progressively pushed back. And this occasions a question: are there 
any really absolutely deep disagreements? And if they are really only 
theoretical possibilities, not regular and inescapable social realities, 
does it matter? 
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